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Microfinance and Household Poverty Reduction: New evidence from India 
 
Abstract 
The  objective  of  the  present  study  is  to  examine  whether  household  access  to  microfinance 
reduces poverty. Using national household data from India, treatment effects model is employed 
to  estimate  the  poverty-reducing  effects  of  MFIs  loans  for  productive  purposes,  such  as 
investment in agriculture or non-farm businesses on household poverty levels. These models take 
into account the endogenous binary treatment effects and sample selection bias associated with 
access to MFIs. Despite some limitations, such as those arising from potential unobservable 
important determinants of access to MFIs, significant positive effect of MFI productive loans on 
multidimensional welfare indicator has been confirmed. The significance of ‘treatment effects’ 
coefficients have been verified by both Tobit and Propensity Score Matching models. In addition, 
we found that loans for productive purposes were more important for poverty reduction in rural 
than  in  urban  areas.  However  in  urban  areas,  simple  access  to  MFIs  has  larger  average 
poverty-reducing effects than the access to loans from MFIs for productive purposes. This leads 
to exploring service delivery opportunities that provide an additional avenue to monitor the 








I.    Introduction 
The expansion of microfinance sector is based on the concept that poor households are affected 
by lack of access to, and inadequate provision of financial services. This attempt to reduce the 
rate of financial exclusion among the poor was seen as an alternative solution for the failures in 
agricultural lending and rural credit assistance practices marred by substantial subsidies, urban 
biased  credit  allocation,  higher  transaction  costs,  high  default  rates,  corrupt  practices  and 
misaligned incentives (Arun et al., 2005). Despite the exceptional growth of the microfinance 
sector  during  the  last  three  decades  in  serving  around  40  million  clients,  most  parts  of  the 
developing world would still remain characterised by huge demand for micro financial services. 
There is a projection about the potential of this market to grow to $250-$300 billion in the near 
future from the existing loan portfolio of $17 billion in mid-2006 (Ehrbeck, 2006). The concept 
and  practice  of  microfinance  have  changed  dramatically  over  the  last  decade  and  the 
microfinance sector is increasingly adopting a financial systems approach, either by operating on 
commercial lines or by  systematically  reducing  reliance on interest rate subsidies and/or aid 
agency financial support (Hulme and Arun 2009). The financial systems approach supports the 
argument  that  microfinance  institutions  should  aim  for  sustainable  financial  services  to  low 
income people, which may risk undermining the potential of institutional innovation for poverty 
reduction  and  social  empowerment.  According  to  Cull  et  al.  (2009),  the  argument  that 
microfinance institutions should seek profits has an appealing ‘win-win’ resonance, admitting 
little trade-off between social and commercial objectives. 
          Irrespective of the renewed emphasis on the financial systems approach, over the years, 
many  Micro  Finance  Institution  (MFIs)  have  developed  a  range  of  services  to  address  the 3 
 
requirements of the poor, such as the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development 
(IGVGD)  programme  of  BRAC,  Bangladesh.  Despite  the  widely  held  belief  among  policy 
makers that microfinance has a relatively small impact on poverty at macro level, some recent 
studies have shown its significant effect on poverty using household survey data. Using the panel 
data at both participant  and household levels in Bangladesh, Khandker  (2005) confirms that 
microfinance programmes have a sustained impact in reducing poverty among the participants, 
especially for female participants and a positive spill over effect at village level. This study 
suggests that microfinance programmes not only help the poor or redistribute income but also 
contribute to national economic growth. However, some studies have shown that MFIs have not 
reached the poorest of the poor in Asian countries (Weiss and Montgomery, 2005) or in Bolivia 
(Mosley 2001). The challenge in serving the poorest of the poor is to identify who might benefit 
from  stand-alone  financial  services  or  from  non-financial  services  with  or  without  finance, 
before participating in market-oriented finance (Meyer 2002). In Bangladesh, Rutherford (2003) 
found that despite the widespread presence of MFIs, their share of total money management 
activities is relatively small. This indicates the need for microfinance institutions to move away 
from being product-based organizations to reflect the heterogeneity of the demand structure for 
financial services/products by poor.   
          The  relationship  between  microfinance  and  poverty  is  still  in  question  and  this  paper 
provides some new empirical evidence on the poverty-reducing effects of MFIs. The existing 
studies on the impact of microfinance provide inconclusive results ranging from a substantial 
positive impact in Bangladesh to ‘zero’ effect in northern Thailand (Cull et al., 2009). This study 
argues  that  the  future  innovations  in  the  microfinance  sector  will  be  reflective  to  the  fresh 4 
 
understandings of the financial lives of the poor households. To capture the multi-dimensional 
aspect of poverty, such as basic needs, wealth, type of housing, job security, sanitation and food 
security, the current study uses Index Based Ranking
1  (IBR) Indicators based on a national-level 
household survey to examine the role of microfinance in poverty reduction in India. 
          In  India,  despite  recent  economic  growth  at  national  level
2,  poverty  remains  a  serious 
problem for policy-makers because the high economic growth is mainly driven by few sectors in 
urban areas, such as industry and service sectors
3. The incidence of poverty in India is estimated 
by quinquennial large sample surveys on household consumption and expenditure and, according 
to the Uniform Recall Period (URP) consumption distribution data, poverty stands at 28.3 per 
cent in rural areas, 25.7 per cent in urban areas and 27.5 per cent for the country as a whole 
(Government of India, 2010). Although the proportion of persons below the poverty line has 
declined from around 36 per cent of the population in 1993-94 to 28 per cent in 2004-05, poverty 
reduction remains the country’s major challenge in the 21
st century.     
Until the early 1990s, financial services were provided through a variety of state sponsored 
institutions, which resulted in impressive achievements in expanding access to credit particularly 
among  the  rural  poor  (Mosley  and  Arun  2003).  Although  many  of  these  commercial  bank 
branches in rural areas were unprofitable, they played a positive role in financial savings and 
                                                 
1  In  spite  of  well  established  concerns  on  IBR  class  of  poverty  measures  such  as  subjectivity, 
substitutability and complementary issues of multi-dimensional poverty and stochastic dominance, we 
remain resolute on its reliability based on some earlier wealth ranking studies including Adams et al. 
(1997) and Pradhan and Ravillion (2000).   
2  For example, real GDP grew by 9.7 % in 2007, 9.2% in 2008, and 6.7% in 2009.     
3  The average annual output growth rates in industry and services sectors in the period 1994-2004 are 
5.6% and 8.2% respectively, while that in the agricultural sector is 2.0% (based on World Bank Data in 
2005 taken from http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ind_aag.pdf. The poverty head count ratio has been 
much higher in rural areas than in urban areas (e.g. Deaton and Kozel 2005 and Sen and Himanshu 2004).         5 
 
reducing poverty. This is evident from the fact that during the period 1951-1991 the financial 
institutions' total share in rural household debt increased from 8.8 per cent to 53.3 per cent and 
the role of money lenders declined significantly (Mosley and Arun 2003; Basu and Srivastava 
2005). However, despite the vast network of banking and cooperative finance institutions and 
strong micro components in various programmes, the performance of the formal financial sector 
still fails to adequately reach out to, or reflect and respond to the requirements of the poor.   
In  the  1990s,  MFIs  became  increasingly  important  in  India  mainly  due  to  their  better 
access  to  local  knowledge  and  information  at  community  level  and  their  use  of  peer  group 
monitoring. For example, microfinance programmes involving SHGs (Self-Help Groups), which 
are based on the existing banking network in delivering financial services to the poor, have 
become increasingly important in India due to their flexible nature (Mosley and Arun 2003). 
SHGs  are  built  on  the  traditional  institution  of  ROSCA  (Rotating  Savings  and  Credit 
Associations) and provide access to both savings and credit for the asset-less poor. A recent 
study  in  Pune  district  in  Maharashtra  showed  that  while  the  targeting  performance  of 
microfinance through SHGs was unsatisfactory in terms of income, it was satisfactory in terms 
of caste (social division based on descent or birth), landlessness and illiteracy and thus facilitated 
the empowerment of women (Gaiha and Nandhi 2007). This study also found that loans were 
used  largely  for  children's  health  and  education  and  argued  against  restricting  the  impact 
assessment of microfinance to conventional economic criteria alone.   
Despite  MFIs’  increasing  involvement  in  poverty  reduction  in  India,  there  have  been 
relatively few studies that empirically evaluate their impact at the national level. The present 
study aims to provide  evidence on the relationship between  role of MFIs  and its impact on 6 
 
poverty in India using a large-scale household data set which was collected with the intention of 
assessing the impact of microfinance. In our study, poverty is defined by the ‘IBR (Indexed 
Based Ranking)  Indicator’, a composite indicator that captures various aspects of wellbeing, 
including land holdings, salaried income sources, livestock, transport assets, housing, and access 
to sanitation facilities
4. Our broad research question is - whether access to MFIs and loans for 
productive purposes reduces poverty. A simple comparison of the average of the IBR indicator 
for households with access to MFIs and those without is not appropriate. Firstly, MFIs are not 
randomly  distributed  due  to  endogenous  programme  placement  where  MFIs  target  poor 
households or poor households tend to take loans from, or save at MFIs (EDA Rural Systems 
2005).  Furthermore,  there  are  self-selection  problems  associated  with  participation  in 
microfinance programmes. That is, within the area where microfinance is available, individuals 
with similar characteristics (e.g. education or age) might have different levels of entrepreneurial 
spirit or ability, which may lead to different probabilities of their participating in the scheme. 
Hence it is necessary to take into account self-selection problems or the endogeneity associated 
with participation in microfinance programmes.     
To address at least partly the sample selection problem, we apply treatment effects model, 
a  version  of  the  Heckman  sample  selection  model  (Heckman,  1979).  We  have  carried  out 
robustness test by using propensity score matching (PSM).
5  We also use Tobit estimation to 
estimate the effect of size of productive loan on poverty. Tobit model is meant to account for left 
censoring  associated  with  unobserved  sample.  Other  robustness  checks  explored  include  (1) 
                                                 
4  See Sinha (2009) for the conceptual framework of IBR indicator.     
5  For brevity, the PSM results are provided only in Appendices 2 and 3. 7 
 
decomposition  of  the  IBR  index into  perception of  income  level  and  food  security
6  and  (2) 
examining whether poverty reducing effects of productive loan would be observed in the case 
where it is replaced by total loan. In all instances, we observe that microfinance has a significant 
positive effect on poverty reduction. 
The treatment effects model estimates the probit model with the same specification as in 
the first stage of PSM. In the second stage, the IBR indicator, our proxy for poverty, is estimated 
by OLS while sample selection is corrected by using estimates of the probability of participation 
in microfinance programmes. The model is fitted by a full maximum likelihood (Maddala, 1983). 
The  merits  of  the  treatment  effects  model  over  PSM  include  that  (i)  the  degree  of  sample 
selection bias is explicitly taken into account and (ii) the determinants of the dependent variable 
in  the  second  stage  are  identified.  However,  the  treatment  effects  model  imposes  strong 
distributional  assumptions  for  the  functions  in  both  stages  and  the  final  results  are  highly 
sensitive to the choice of explanatory variables and the instrument. The presence of unobservable 
variables would also affect the results as in PSM. Given these limitations, applying different 
models is useful as each model serves to check the robustness of the results derived by the other.         
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II summarises the survey design and 
data.  Section  III  describes  the  econometric  intuition  underlying  treatment  effects  and  Tobit 
model. Section IV provides the econometric results and main findings.    The concluding remarks 
are given in the final section.       
                                                 
6  These two components are deemed only candidates for decomposition analysis given the data 
limitations, e.g. insensitivity of other components in IBR, such as land-holding or household access to 
sanitation facilities, to microfinance access or loan amount. The choice of these proxies was also guided 





II. Survey Design and Data 
7   
Details of Survey   
The original survey was carried out by EDA Systems for SIDBI (Small Industries Development 
Bank  of  India)  in  2001  as  a  part  of  SIDBI’s  impact  assessment  study  of  its  micro  finance 
programme.  This  cross-sectional  socio-economic  research  was  undertaken  to  assess,  on  a 
national scale, the development impact of MFI programmes. The study covered a sample of 20 
SIDBI's  partner  Micro  Finance  Institutions  (MFIs)  and  5260  households  distributed  across 
different  and  diverse  regions  of  India,  including  both  clients  and  non-clients  (EDA  Rural 
Systems  2005;  SIDBI  2005).  Our  study  is  based  on  the  cross-sectional  data  set  for  these 
households.     
The  hypothesis  of  our  study  is:    (1)  access  to  microfinance  institutions  (MFIs)  and 
productive loan reduces poverty and (2) amount of productive loan has a poverty reducing effect. 
Five types of MFI were selected as representative of 31 MFIs in SFMC
8’s list of current partners 
- representing different regions and models of microfinance (Self Help Group (SHG), Grameen, 
Individual Banking and sector/enterprise specific cooperatives), age, outreach to members and 
range  of  services.  At  each  MFI,  two  to  four  sample  areas  (villages  or  urban  wards)  were 
purposefully  selected  to represent  a  typical  area of  the  MFI  in  terms  of  the  socio-economic 
context and range of MFI programmes. Within each sample area, a stratified random sample of 
clients, non-clients and dropouts was drawn using wealth ranking as a basis for stratification 
                                                 
7  This section is based on EDA Rural Systems (2002, 2005), SIDBI (2005) and Sinha (2009).   
8  It stands for SIDBI (Small Industries Development Bank of India) Foundation for Micro Credit.   9 
 
(EDA Rural Systems 2002, 2005). The ratio of non-client households to MFI client households 
was set at 1:2.75 for most of the villages. This ratio was chosen to reflect the average non-client 
to  client  ratio  of  the  population  in  the  village  or  the  urban  wards  where  microfinance 
programmes were in operation. For each group of clients in the programme area, an appropriate 
number of non-client households with similar characteristics (based on wealth, social group or 
female-headedness) were chosen in the same program area as a comparison group.   
 
Index Based Ranking (IBR) Indicators   
Index Based Ranking (IBR) Indicators were created to overcome any limitations of the income 
or  consumption  based  poverty  measures  and  to  capture  non-income  or  multi-dimensional 
dimensions of poverty, such as basic needs, wealth, type of housing, job or employment security, 
sanitation, and food security (Sinha 2009). A score index, such as  IBR, is useful to capture 
various dimensions of poverty because of its higher practicality (e.g. less costly than those for 
expenditure  surveys;  based  on  less-sensitive  /obtrusive  and  simpler  questions)  and  higher 
reliability due to lower risk of falsification or error. Respondents are asked about their quality of 
life in several dimensions and then IBR indicators are created as a weighted sum of scores for 
different categories with a maximum score of 60.   
          The  actual  scoring  is  based  on  quantitative  observations  of  trained  researchers  using 
common criteria. The dimensions include (i) agriculture (e.g. area in acres, value of crop sold 
last year in rupees, and, as a proxy for food security, the number of months the stock of crop 
would meet family needs); (ii) employment (e.g. regularity of income, type of employment - 
permanent or ad hoc, binary classification of income level, number of people employed); (iii) 10 
 
animal husbandry (the number of buffalos, cows, goats, pigs, and poultry); (iv) transport and 
household assets (e.g. the number of bicycles, rickshaws, two or four wheelers; ownership of 
fridge, TV, or phone); (v) house ownership and housing type (owned, rented, or homeless; house 
size - large, medium, or small, electrical connection); and (vi) sanitation (with or without access 
to public, shared or own toilet (inside or not), with or without bath, inside or outside). The IBR 
indicator thus reflects income or employment or business characteristics, basic needs such as 
food  security,  the  availability  of  sanitation  facilities,  housing  and  asset  characteristics. 
Households are grouped into five categories, namely ‘very poor’ (with an IBR indicator of 8 or 
less;  5.1%  of  the  total  sample  of  5260),  ‘poor’  (IBR  -  9-18;  23.6%),  ‘moderately  poor  or 
borderline’ (IBR - 19-29; 33.5%), ‘self-sufficient’ (IBR - 30-40; 33.5%), and ‘surplus’ (IBR - 
41-60  (Sinha,  2009).  Thus,  the  very  poor  or  the  poor  have  relatively  insecure  agricultural 
income, few animal or household assets, relying on casual labour, and lower level of sanitation. 
Incidentally,  the  share  of  ‘the  poor’  and  ‘the  very  poor’  (28.7%)  in  our  study  matches,  the 
poverty head count ratio for all India in 2004-5 based on the national poverty line applied to the 
National Sample Survey data (Himanshu, 2007).   
 
Descriptive Statistics and Definitions of the Variables   
The present study employs two different definitions of access to MFIs; (a) whether a household 
is a client of any MFI (“MFI_Access”) or not, and (b) whether a household has taken a loan from 
MFI for a productive activity (“MFI_Productive”). The first definition is used to observe the 11 
 
effect  of  simply  accessing  MFI  on  poverty.
9  The  second  is  concerned  with  whether  the 
household has taken loans for productive activities (and has an outstanding balance of those 
loans  at  the  time  of  survey),  leading  to  an  increase  in  production,  e.g.  buying  inputs  for 
agriculture  or  investment  in  non-farm  business,  such  as  repairing  a  shop.  This  is  based  on 
borrowers’ broad perception of the use of loans taken from MFIs. In this category, the loan used 
for  self  consumption  or  non-productive  purposes  is  excluded.  The  binary  classification  of 
‘whether  the  household  used  the  MFI  loans  for productive  purposes’  is  based  solely  on  the 
respondents' perception of the nature of their loans and thus the possibility cannot be ruled out 
that loans were actually used for other purposes. Thus, caution is needed in interpreting the 
results.         
          Appendix 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables for the sample households with 
access to MFIs and for those without. As shown by the number of observations in two columns 
(third and sixth), about three quarters of the sample households have access to MFIs in both rural 
and urban areas.  About a half of them has access to loans from MFI for productive purposes. 
In general, there is a relatively small difference between the descriptive statistics of each variable 
for the households with access to MFIs (or with access to MFI loans for productive purposes) 
and  for  those  without,  except  in  a  few  cases  (e.g.  there  are  higher  proportions  of  larger 
households with lower dependency ratios and households with non-farm business opportunities 
among  those  receiving  MFI  loans  than  among  those  without).  That  is  partly  because  of  the 
design of the sample survey where households with relatively similar characteristics are chosen 
in each village. The higher proportion of female-headed households probably indicates that MFIs 
                                                 
9  ‘Being a client’ means that any member of the household has either savings or loan account with MFIs 
at the time of survey.   12 
 
use sex of the head of household for targeting female/poorer clients. For most rural households, 
the household head is either illiterate or ‘completed primary school’ only, while all of those in 
urban areas completed only primary school.   
          A  household  typically  has  about  five  members.  About  30%  of  the  sample  households 
belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (population groupings based on descent or birth 
and are explicitly recognized by the Constitution of India). The proportion of Hindus is relatively 
higher in urban areas, while that of Muslims is relatively higher in rural areas. Other religions 
include  Christianity  and  Sikhism.  We  created  a  variable  on  ‘business  availability’,  the 
availability of non-farm business opportunities for households. It is assumed that more business 
opportunities will increase the demand for microfinance. This is proxied by the proportion of 
households engaged in non-farm business in a village. As expected, it is higher in urban areas. 
The average IBR indicator of households in rural areas is lower than in urban areas, implying 
that poverty is more severe in rural areas. The IBR indicator is higher for those with access to 
MFIs (or those with access to MFI loans for productive purposes) than those without. However, 
this may not necessarily imply that access to MFIs reduces poverty due to the possible sample 
selection biases. The next section will address the methodologies by which the treatment effects 
and Tobit models take account of sample selection biases and censoring respectively.       
 
III. Methodology 
We use the treatment effects model for the effect of access to MFIs and productive loans on 
poverty  reduction.  While  this  approach  addresses  sample  selection  issues,  we  check  for 
robustness  using  Propensity  Score  Matching  and  report  its  findings  in  Appendices  2  and  3. 13 
 
Secondly, we apply Tobit regression to investigate the poverty reducing effect of productive loan 
amount.               
 
(1) Treatment effects Model   
Our  main  hypothesis  is  that  access  to  microfinance  institutions  (MFIs)  reduces  poverty  as 
defined by the IBR indicators. Because we have only cross-sectional data, we can compare IBR 
indicators of households with access to MFIs and those without, as long as MFIs are randomly 
distributed across the sample. However, we cannot simply statistically compare the average of 
IBR indicators for those with access to MFIs and those without because of the sample selection 
bias.  The  sample  selection  problem  may  arise  from  (1)  self  selection  where  the  households 
themselves  decide  whether  or  not  to  participate  in  MFI  programmes,  which  depends  on 
observable  and  unobservable  household  characteristics,  and/or  (2)  endogenous  program 
placement where those who implement microfinance programmes select (a group of) households 
with specific characteristics (e.g. high poverty rates or reasonably good credit records depending 
on  the  programme  specifications).  Heckman  Sample  Selection  Model  could  be  used  to 
compensate for sample selection bias or the endogeneity associated with household access to 
MFIs.   
        We employ the treatment effects’ model version of the Heckman sample selection model 
(Heckman, 1979), which estimates the effect of an endogenous binary treatment. This enables us 
to compensate for sample selection bias associated with access to MFIs. In the first stage, access 
to MFI is estimated by a probit model. In the second, we estimate the IBR indicator by various 
household characteristics and a dummy variable on whether the household participates in the MF 14 
 
programme after controlling for the inverse Mill’s ratio which reflects  the degree of sample 
selection  bias.  The  instrument  used  is  the  availability  of  formal  banks
10  at  the  village  level 
(proxy for the level of local financial services) which determines the demand for microfinance, 
but would not directly affect the poverty level of the household.   
          The  merit  of  the  treatment  effects  model  is  that  sample  selection  bias  is  explicitly 
estimated by using the results of the probit model. However, its weak aspects include (i) strong 
assumptions being imposed on distributions of the error terms in the first and the second stages, 
(ii) the results being sensitive to the choice of explanatory variables and instruments, and (iii) 
valid instruments rarely found in non-experimental data.   
          The selection mechanism by the probit model above can be more explicitly specified as 
(e.g. Greene, 2003):         
i i
*
i u X D + γ =                                                                                                                     (3)’ 
                                                    and 




i > + γ = =                                    
                                                    otherwise 0 D
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i =  
where 
                                                      { } ) X ( X 1 D Pr i i i γ′ Φ = =  
                                                      { } ) X ( 1 X 0 D Pr i i i γ′ Φ − = =  
                                                                                                        and 
 




i > + γ = =        
 
 
                                                 
10  Hausman test has been carried out to compare the coefficient estimates of treatment effects model and 
those of OLS to test the validity of ’availability of formal banks’ as an instrument. The instrument is 
deemed valid on the ground that its coefficient estimate is statistically significant in the treatment effects 
model and the difference of coefficient estimates of these two models are also significant as shown by 
Hausman test.   15 
 
   
*
i D is a latent variable. In our case,  i D   equals 1 if a household has access to MFIs and 0 
otherwise,  i X is a vector of household characteristics and the instrument for the participation 
equation, that is, the proportion of households with access to formal banks,  Φ  , denotes the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function.   
 
          The linear outcome regression model in the second stage is specified below to examine the 
determinants of poverty, proxied by IBR (index based ranking) score or i W . That is,   
i i i i D Z W ε + θ + β′ =       (4)   
 
                                                          ( ) i i u ε ~ bivariate normal[ ] ρ σε, , 1 , 0 , 0 .     
 
where  θis the average net wealth benefit of participating in MF programmes.  i Z is the same as 
i X except that it does not include instruments for the MFI participation equation.   
          Using  a  formula  for  the  joint  density  of  bivariate  normally  distributed  variables,  the 
expected IBR indicator for those with access to MFIs (or clients) is expressed as:     
                           









1 D E Z 1 D W E
γ′ Φ
γ′ φ
ρσ + θ + β′ =
= ε + θ + β′ = =
ε
                                          (5) 
where  φis the standard normal density function. The ratio of  φand  Φ  is called the inverse 
Mill’s ratio.   
          The expected IBR for non-clients is:     
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The expected effect of poverty reduction associated with MFI access is computed as (Greene, 
2003, 787-789):   
       
[ ] [ ] ( )
( ) ( ) [ ] i i
i
i i i i X 1 X
X
0 D W E 1 D W E
γ′ Φ − γ′ Φ
γ′ φ
ρσ + θ = = − = ε
                          (7)   
If  ρ   is  positive  (negative),  the  coefficient  estimate  θ   of  using  OLS  is  biased  upward 
(downward) and the sample selection term will correct this. Since  ε σ   is positive, the sign and 
significance of the estimate of  ε ρσ (usually denoted as  λ β ) will show whether any selection 
bias exists. To estimate the parameters of this model, the likelihood function given by Maddala 
(1983, 122) is used where the bivariate normal function is reduced to the univariate function and 
the correlation ρ. The predicted values of (5) and (6) are derived and compared by the standard t 
test to examine whether the average treatment effect or poverty reducing effect is significant. 
 
             
(2)  Tobit Model 
In our bid to estimate the effect of productive loan amount on household poverty, non-zero 
values occur only when the former has been accessed by a household. This generates a censored 
sample in which Maddala (1983) and Amemiya (1984) argue that estimating least squares on the 
reduced sample leads to biased and inconsistent results. The other alternative of categorizing the 
dependent variable into a binary outcome, masks actual predictions since the use of either logit 
or probit reveals estimates premised on the probability that the dependent variable lies above a 17 
 
certain  threshold.  Tobit  (hybrid  between  probit  and  least  squares)  uses  information  on  all 
observations. The model takes the form: 
                   
                                                                                    (8) 
                                                   
where    is the dependent variable,    is the vector of independent variables,    is the vector 
of unknown coefficients,    represents the independently distributed error term. Underlying the 
estimation of equation (8), is a latent variable    which is assumed to be linearly related to the 
vector of independent variables. In effect we calculate the normalized coefficients which needs 
to be multiplied by the standard error to ascertain the actual sort for    estimates.   
 
IV. Results     
(1)  Treatment Effect Model     
We first provide the probit results for the treatment effects model to investigate the impacts of 
access to MFIs and productive loans on poverty. Because of the fundamental differences of 
environment, industrial structures, household characteristics and activities between urban and 
rural areas, we first derive the estimations for total households and then for urban areas and rural 
areas separately. The results of the probit model imply the sort of characteristics which are the 
key determinants underlying access to, and use of, microfinance services.   
          The estimation results of the probit model in Table 1 are generally intuitive in the case of 
all households where the dependent variable is ‘MFI_Access’ (i.e. Case A-1). A household with 
an older household head is more likely to be an MFI client, but the negative coefficient of the 18 
 
age square suggests a non-linear effect, which is significant for both total and rural households. 
Also, a household with a female head is more likely to be a client, which reflects the fact that 
microfinance programmes target women. Education variables are not significant. Dependency 
ratio has a negative and significant effect. The coefficient estimate of ‘business availability’ is 
positive and significant in Cases A-1 (total) and A-3 (rural areas). If a household deals with 
formal banks, it is less likely to be an MFI client. This is significant in Cases A-1 and A-3. The 
coefficient  estimates  of  loans  from  formal  banks,  money  lenders,  friends  and  relatives  are 
negative, which reflects the fact that those who cannot obtain loans, or can only obtain smaller 
loans
11, tend to use MFI services. The availability of formal banks is positive and significant in 
urban areas and negative and significant in rural areas. That is, households in areas where formal 
banks are not available are more (less) likely to be MFI clients in rural (urban) areas.
12         
However,  in  Case  B-1  where  ‘MFI_Productive’  is  estimated,  a  few  differences  are 
observed. The coefficient estimate of ‘Female’ (headedness) is negative in Case B-1 (total) and 
Case B-3 (rural areas), that is, a household with a male head is more likely to take a loan for 
productive purposes. This may reflect the fact that, although microfinance focuses on women, 
male-headed households are more likely to take loans for productive purposes. The coefficient 
estimates  of  variables  on  ‘Education’  are  positive  and  significant.  Households  with  more 
educated heads are more likely to take MFI loans for productive purposes, while education does 
                                                 
11  Average loan size for the current study is about USD600, compared with global average of about 
USD530 (MIX, 2009).   
12  We estimated the treatment effects model based on the probit without the variables on access to other 
financial services for both    ‘MFI-Access’ and ‘MFI-Productive’ noting that these may not be exogenous. 
The coefficient estimates of variables show similar results in the cases without the variables on access to 
other financial services. The final results of the treatment effects model and PSM model are also similar. 
However, this has a shortcoming of not controlling for the variables on other financial services and thus 
we decided to present the cases with these variables.   19 
 
not matter for simple access to MFI. The coefficient estimates of ‘Caste_dum’ (dummy for caste) 
are negative and significant in Case B-1 and Case B-3. That is, households which do not belong 
to  Scheduled  Castes  or  Scheduled  Tribes  are  more  likely  to  be  MFI  clients,  suggesting  the 
exclusion  of  socially  disadvantaged  groups  from  MFI  loans  for  productive  purposes.  The 
availability of non-farm business is highly significant in all cases as this increases the demand 
for loans for productive purposes. In rural areas transactions with formal banks and loans from 
money  lenders  show  positive  and  significant  signs,  that  is,  other  financial  services  serve  as 
complements to MFI loans for productive services. On the other hand, the coefficient estimate of 
loans from formal banks is negative and significant in Case B-2 for urban areas. That is, those 
who cannot get loans from the formal banks tend to obtain MFI loans for productive purposes in 
urban areas. Formal bank availability at village level is negative and significant in Case B-1 
(total) and Case B-3 (rural areas). Rural households living in a village with more difficult access 
to formal banks are more likely to take MFI loans.             
 
(Table 1 to be inserted around here) 
 
Based on the regression results of the probit model in Table 1, we estimate treatment effects 
models and present the results in Table 2 for the total sample and for urban and rural areas, 
separately for the cases where whether the household had access to MFI is estimated in the probit 
model (Cases A-1, A-2, and A-3) and for those where the households obtained a loan for any 
productive  purposes  (Cases  B-1,  B-2,  and  B-3).  The  dependent  variable  is  either  aggregate 
Indexed Based Ranking (IBR) of a household's wellbeing, or a disaggregated component of IBR- 20 
 
namely, perceived income level or food security. Note that higher value of a dependent variable 
reflects higher wellbeing or lower poverty. Most of the results are similar irrespective of the 
areas chosen or the definitions of the dependent variable in the first stage.   
 
(Table 2 to be inserted around here) 
Most of the coefficient estimates of dependent variables show the expected signs. Households 
with older household heads tend to have higher IBR indicators with some non-linear effects, that 
is, the IBR indicator first increases as the household head gets older and then decreases. Female-
headed households are associated with lower IBR indicators. Both completing primary education 
and higher education are associated with higher IBR indicators, and thus lower poverty. Larger 
households tend to have higher  IBR indicators, but a larger proportion of elderly people or 
children in a household have a counter effect. If the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or 
Scheduled Tribe, it is likely to have a lower IBR. Being Hindu has a positive and significant 
effect and being Muslim has a negative effect in the cases for total sample and for rural areas, 
while their coefficient estimates are non-significant for urban areas.   
          The  availability  of  non-farm  business  opportunities  is  significantly  and  positively 
associated  with  a  higher  IBR  Indicator.  Variables  controlling  for  access  to  other  sources  of 
financial services (namely, loans from formal banks, money lenders, friends and relatives) show 
positive and significant coefficients. This implies that a household less financially constrained is 
less likely to be poor. Our results would remain the same if the variables on having access to 
other financial services were omitted. The positive coefficient for Θ implies that the net benefit 21 
 
of having access to MFI is significant and positive in urban areas even without controlling for 
sample selection bias. 
          The last panel of Table 2 shows the treatment effects or the average poverty reducing 
effects in accessing MFIs or taking loans for productive purposes. In both instances (access to 
MFIs  and  productive  loan)  and  for  both  urban  and  rural  areas  significant  average  poverty 
reducing  effects  are  observed.  Incidentally,  the  results  on  the  size  and  sign  of  the  poverty 
reducing effects in each case are very similar to those derived by kernel matching for PSM. This 
would support our results based on PSM with the caveat that both methodologies have their own 
limitations. That is, on average, having access to MFI or taking loans from MFI reduces poverty 
(see Appendices 2 and 3).
13  In each of the cases, the decomposed IBR indicators of perceived 
income level and food security show significant average poverty reducing effect.         
 
(2) Tobit Regression Results 
The  sample  for  regressing  amount  of  productive  loan  on  well  being  was  restricted  only  to 
households that had access to microfinance institutions and productive  loan. The results are 
presented in Table 3.   
 
(Tables 3 to be inserted around here) 
 
Given the outcome of the effect of sample selection above, the results emerging from the Tobit 
estimation shows a highly significant positive relationship between productive loan amount and 
                                                 
13  See Imai and Arun (2008) for details of the methodologies and results of PSM.   22 
 
households  poverty  after  controlling  for  socio-economic  characteristics.  It  is  noted  that  the 
coefficient estimate of amount of productive loan, though its absolute value is small, is more 
highly significant in urban area (at 1 % level) than in rural area (significant only at 10 % level). 
The results of other covariates are not much different from the second stage results of Treatment 
effects model in Table 2. It has been confirmed that larger amount of productive loan improves 
well-being, a finding consistent with the underlying thrust of microfinance evolution. It is noted 
that this finding supports the earlier results both from the treatment effects model PSM.   
          Also as a form of robustness check, we observe a significant poverty reducing effect in the 
case of total loans. The results are shown in Table 4.   
 
(Tables 4 to be inserted around here) 
 
A similar pattern of the results are obtained in the cases where we estimate the effects of amount 
of total loan on poverty. That is, larger amount of productive loan reduces poverty in both urban 
and rural areas. It is noted that coefficient estimate of total loan is significant at 1 % level in both 
urban and rural areas.   
 
V. Conclusions     
Drawing upon a national-level cross-sectional household data set in India in 2001, the present 
study analyses the impact of Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) on household poverty, based on 
the Indexed Based Ranking (IBR) Indicator which reflects multi-dimensional aspects of poverty. 
The treatment effects model, a version of the Heckman sample selection model, and Tobit model 23 
 
are  employed  to  estimate  poverty-reducing  effects  of  access  to  MFIs  and  loans  used  for 
productive purposes, such as investment in agriculture or non-farm businesses. The propensity 
score matching (PSM) model has been also used to check the robustness of the results. These 
models compensate for endogenous binary treatment effects or sample selection bias associated 
with  access  to  MFIs.  Despite  some  limitations  e.g.  arising  from  potentially  unobservable 
important determinants of participation in microfinance programmes, significantly both models 
confirmed positive effects of MFI access on the multidimensional welfare indicator, a result 
which suggests that MFIs play a significant role in poverty reduction. If we consider the results 
for rural and urban areas separately, some interesting observations emerge. For households in 
rural areas, a larger poverty reducing effect of MFIs is observed when access to MFIs is defined 
as taking loans from MFIs for productive purposes than in the case of simply having access to 
MFIs. In urban areas, on the contrary, simple access to MFIs has larger average poverty-reducing 
effects than taking loans from MFIs for productive purposes. 
          The finding of this study provides further impetus to the existing evidences on the impact 
of microfinance institutions on the household poverty. In rural areas, while significant poverty 
reducing effects are observed in all cases, taking loans for productive purposes has a larger 
impact  in  raising  the  IBR  indicator  for  those  above  the  poverty  threshold.  That  is,  clients’ 
intended use of loans is important in determining poverty reduction outcomes. In the context of 
‘profit-making poverty reduction’ era, the finding on outreach and productive use of loan for 
better  impact  warrants  more  policy  choices.  Although  many  microfinance  institutions  have 
moved on to reflect the heterogeneity of the demand structure for financial services/products by 
poor, there is yet to develop a consistent framework to monitor the usage of loan with adequate 24 
 
flexibility to capture different levels of participating nature of the households. This leads to 
further options in the delivery of services such as the integration of non-financial services solely 
or in partnership with other development agencies that provides an additional avenue to monitor 
the usage of loans and enhance the outreach. The challenge lies in how to design an optimal mix 
of delivery options to enhance the impact and outreach that determines the nature and character 
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Table 1 Results of Probit Model on the Determinants of Access to Microfinance 
Case A: Dep Variable: whether a household has access to a MFI (“MFI_access”) 
  Case A-1: Total  Case A-2: Urban  Case A-3: Rural 
   Coef.  Z value 
1)  Coef.  Z value     Coef.  Z value    
Age  0.0138  (1.80) 
+  0.0008  (0.05)    0.0167  (1.90) 
+ 
Age_square  -0.0003  (-3.22) 
**  -0.0002  (-0.78)    -0.0003  (-3.12) 
** 
Female  0.2917  (4.09) 
**  0.3445  (2.47) 
*  0.2721  (3.25) 
** 
Primary Education  -0.0456  (-0.91)    -  -    -0.0442  (-0.86)   
Higher Education   -0.0532  (-0.40)    -  -    -0.1251  (-0.93)   
Hhsize  0.0116  (1.08)    0.0389  (1.62)    0.0054  (0.44)   
Dependency  -0.6427  (-8.03) 
**  -0.7791  (-5.15) 
**  -0.5695  (-5.98) 
** 
Caste_dum  0.0043  (0.10)    0.0937  (1.00)    -0.0629  (-1.20)   
Hindu  -0.2813  (-4.15) 
**  -0.5754  (-1.13)    -0.2874  (-4.13) 
** 
Muslim  -0.2696  (-2.97) 
**  -0.7683  (-1.46)    -0.2637  (-2.69) 
** 
Business Availability  0.4623  (4.99) 
**  0.1259  (0.53)    0.5052  (4.91) 
** 
Formal banks (transaction)   -0.1729  (-4.07) 
**  -0.1106  (-1.30)    -0.1965  (-3.95) 
** 
Formal banks (loan)  -0.7160  (-0.71)    -1.7400  (-1.44)    0.0000  (0.71)   
Money lenders (loan)  -0.1120  (-0.28)    3.1300  (1.53)    0.0000  (-0.38)   
Friends/Relatives (loan)  -1.5200  (-1.70) 
+  -2.1500  (-1.16)    0.0000  (-1.45)   
Whether in urban areas   -0.0136  (-0.25)    -  -    -  -   
Formal Bank Availability  0.0305  (0.26)    0.5640  (2.49) 
*  -0.2560  (-1.73) 
+ 
Constant  1.2553  (5.86) 
   1.8643  (2.81) 
   1.2079  (4.88) 
  
No. of Obs.  5327    1385    3942   
Joint Significance  LR Chi
2(11)=168.16 







Log likelihood  -2987.18    -756.52    -2216.72   
Pseudo R2  0.0325 
   0.0467     0.0272    
   
         
Case B: Dep Variable: whether a household has taken a loan for productive purposes (“MFI_productive”) 
  Case B-1: Total  Case B-2: Urban  Case B-3: Rural 
   Coef.  Z value 
   Coef.  Z value     Coef.  Z value    
Age  0.0030  (0.40)    0.0047  (0.28)    0.0032  (0.36)   
Age_square  -0.0001  (-1.70) 
+  -0.0002  (-0.91)    -0.0001  (-1.48)   
Female  -0.1007  (-1.53)    0.0345  (0.27)    -0.1586  (-2.06) 
* 
Primary Education  0.1221  (2.52) 
*  -  -    0.1029  (2.08) 
* 
Higer Education   0.5804  (4.58) 
**  -  -    0.5714  (4.45) 
** 
Hhsize  0.0161  (1.56)    -0.0246  (-1.10)    0.0278  (2.37) 
* 
Dependency  -0.8102  (-10.30) 
**  -1.1665  (-7.65) 
**  -0.6502  (-7.00) 
** 
Caste_dum  -0.1119  (-2.60) 
**  -0.2173  (-2.39) 
*  -0.1003  (-1.99) 
* 29 
 
Hindu  -0.0578  (-0.92)    -0.7196  (-1.83) 
+  -0.0249  (-0.38)   
Muslim  -0.0217  (-0.25)    -0.7420  (-1.77) 
+  0.0186  (0.20)   
Business Availability  1.5358  (17.01) 
**  1.5476  (6.73) 
**  1.4843  (14.79) 
** 
Formal banks (transaction)   0.1123  (2.73) 
**  0.0219  (0.27)    0.1239  (2.56) 
* 
Formal banks (loan)  -1.3700  (-1.32)    0.0000  (-1.84) 
+  0.0000  (0.63)   
Money lenders (loan)  2.0900  (4.25) 
**  0.0000  (0.48)    0.0000  (4.36) 
** 
Friends/Relatives (loan)  1.7200  (1.84) 
+  0.0000  (1.27)    0.0000  (1.25)   
Whether in urban areas   -0.7122  (-13.59) 
**  -  -    -  -   
Formal Bank Availability  -0.3367  (-2.96) 
**  0.0932  (0.43)    -0.5536  (-3.89) 
** 
Constant  0.1755  (0.85)     0.2760  (0.49)     0.0194  (0.08)    
No. of Obs.  5327    1385    3942   











Log likelihood  -3291.66    -831.14    -2445.7   
Pseudo R2  0.107 
   0.0957     0.0899    
Notes: 1) ** = significant at 1% level.  * = significant at 5% level.  + = significant at 10% level.       
     2)  Education is dropped in case of urban areas as there is no variation in the variable.   




























Table  2  The  Results  of  Treatment  effects  Model  for  Poverty  (IBR,  Income  and  Food  Security 
measures of well being) (The First Stage: whether a household has access to productive assets/ whether a 
household has loan from MFI for productive purposes is shown in Table 1) 
Case A: Dep. (the first-stage probit estimates whether a household has access to a MFI (“MFI_Access”)) 
  Case A-1: Total  Case A-2: Urban  Case A-3: Rural 
   IBR  Income 
Food 
Security  IBR  Income 
Food 
Security  IBR  Income 
Food 
Security 
Age  0.2210  0.0167  0.0478  0.3728  0.0225  -0.0037  0.2077  0.0131  0.1248 
  (3.95)
 **  (3.56)**  (1.84)  (2.93)
 **  (2.47)**  (-0.34)  (3.18)
 **  (2.58)**  (3.45)** 
Age_square  -0.0009  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0016  -0.0002  0.0000  -0.0016  -0.0002  -0.0011 
  (-1.42)  (-4.12)**  (-0.47)  (-1.05)  (-2.16)**  (0.27)  (-2.11)
 *  (-3.07)**  (-2.82)** 
Female  4.7049  -0.1394  0.9687  -4.5313  0.0096  -0.0834  -3.5385  (-0.1434)  0.8613 
  (9.54)
 **  (-3.49)**  (3.35)**  (-4.60)
 **  (0.13)  (-1.02)
  (-5.72)
 **  (-3.21)**  (2.70)** 
Primary 
Education  1.1642  0.1166  -1.4746  -  -  -  0.6229  0.0993  0.4781 
  (3.26)
 **  (3.88)**  (-9.90)**  -  -  -  (1.73)
 +  (3.41)**  (-7.27)** 
Higher 
Education   2.0793  0.3377  0.1414  -  -  -  1.6409  0.3373  0.0888 
  (2.29)
 *  (4.41)**  (0.38)  -  -  -  (1.82)
 +  (4.63)**  (0.92) 
Hhsize  0.6061  0.0184  0.0902  1.0662  0.0201  0.0064  0.4423  0.0123  -1.5068 
  (8.01)
 **  (2.89)**  (2.88)**  (6.20)
 **  (1.60)  (0.44)  (5.18)
 **  (1.78)  (1.81) 
Dependency  -0.9876  -0.3283  -1.3235  1.9087  -0.0299  -0.2880  -4.3710  -0.3307  -2.9737 
  (-1.46)  (-6.62)**  (-2.30)  (1.60)  (-0.29)  (-3.01)**  (-4.53)
 **  (-5.85)**  (-7.26)** 
Caste_dum  -3.8773  0.0676  1.4962  -4.5531  0.1180  -0.0413  -3.7885  0.0748  2.0096 
  (-12.54)
 **  (2.59)**  (11.68)**  (-6.67)
 **  (2.38)**  (-0.72)  (-10.76)
 **  (2.63)**  (9.91)** 
Hindu  1.4548  -0.2877  0.9492  -1.7161  -0.6213  0.0264  1.2874  -0.2763  0.5145 
  (2.68)
 **  (-6.35)**  (3.67)**  (-0.60)  (-3.00)**  (0.11)  (2.26)
 *  (-6.27)**  (1.64) 
Muslim  -1.4477  -0.4264  -0.1867  -3.0860  -0.8484  -0.1017  -1.2351  -0.3926  -0.8063 
  (-2.15)
 *  (-7.55)**  (-0.62)  (-1.00)  (-3.79)**  (-0.40)  (-1.74)
 +  (-6.88)**  (-1.99) 
Business 
Availability  6.4979  0.0947  -0.7107  9.5918  -0.4086  0.2392  7.5205  0.1525  0.3766 
  (9.96)
 **  (1.84)
+  (-1.62)  (6.21)
 **  (-3.55)**  (1.86)  (9.14)
 **  (2.79)**  (0.96) 
Formal 
banking sector   6.2691  0.1190  0.6998  6.7404  0.1867  0.0431  4.9097  0.1070  0.5159 
  (21.22)
 **  (4.94)**  (4.15)**  (11.56)
 **  (4.47)**  (0.88)  (12.42)
 **  (3.91)**  (2.63)** 
Formal  banks 
(loans)  36.1392  0.9283  -0.4832  32.9048  1.8732  -1.2435  55.4760  0.5865  10.4186 
  (4.87)
 **  (1.48)  (-0.15)  (3.43)
 **  (2.67)**  (-1.55)  (3.98)
 **  (0.52)  (1.30) 
Money  lenders 
(loans)  13.5712  0.6124  -1.3035  -23.3631  -1.9671  6.6149  24.6858  1.0819  -3.1244 
  (2.54)
 *  (1.36)  (-0.57)  (-1.75)
 +  (-2.02)**  (5.92)**  (4.22)
 **  (2.29)**  (-0.93) 
Friends/Relativ
es(loans)  62.6509  -0.0020  -1.8516  80.0072  0.5150  -0.5091  41.7274  0.1302  -6.2080 
  (8.22)
 **  (0.00)  (-0.54)  (5.75)
 **  (0.51)  (-0.44)  (4.38)
 **  (0.17)  (-1.16) 
Whether  in 
urban areas   10.1017  0.1301  -2.6641  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  (27.24)
 **  (4.16)**  (-17.44)**  -  -  -  -  -  - 31 
 
Θ  8.5276  -1.0189  -1.2074  15.0780  0.1351  -0.8633  -4.9649  -0.9533  -6.8136 
  (5.76)
 **  (-35.19)**  (-0.54)  (10.45)
 **  (0.53)  (-25.02)**  (-1.69)
 +  (-30.28)**  (-17.34)** 
λ  -4.0009  0.6376  0.7505  -7.1425  - 0.0562  0.8114  3.6335  0.5958  4.0938 
  (-4.63)
 **  (41.26)**  (0.57)  (8.86)
 **    0.38  (44.17)
**  (2.12)
 **  (35.52)**  (18.72)
** 
Constant  -6.8068  1.0151  1.1476  -10.4329  0.4351  0.8439
   8.6273  1.0388  4.6300
  
 
(-3.38)  (7.86)**  (0.54)  (-2.33)  (1.09)  (2.36)**  (2.74)  (7.35)**  (4.42)** 
                 






































**   
Log likelihood  -21145.74  - 7761.94   κ  -5714.69  - 2277.25   - 1961.65  -15359.73  - 5461.78  - 12784.15    
Case B: Dep. Variable: Index Based Ranking  
(the first-stage probit estimates whether a household has taken a loan 
 for productive purposes (“MFI_productive”)) 
  Case B-1: Total  Case B-2: Urban  Case B-3: Rural 
   IBR  Income 
Food 
Security  IBR  Income 
Food 
Security  IBR  Income  Food Security 
Age  0.2700  0.0110  0.0408  0.3770  0.0213  -0.0035  0.1751  0.0069  0.0812 
  (4.69)
 **  (2.54)*  (1.78)
+  (2.80)
 **  (1.95)
+  (-0.30)  (2.89)
 **  (1.41)  (2.68)** 
Age_square  -0.0021  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0016  -0.0002  0.0000  -0.0011  -0.0001  -0.0004 
  (-3.26)
 **  (-3.02)**  (0.20)  (-1.01)  (-1.44)  (0.17)  (-1.65)
 +  (-1.91)
+  (-1.18) 
Female  -4.0562  -0.0210  1.0344  3.2461  0.0058  -0.0117  4.0785  -0.0140  1.5676 
  (-8.23)
 **  (-0.57)  (5.21)**  (3.15)
 **  (0.07)  (-0.13)  (7.56)
 **  (-0.33)  (5.68)** 
Primary 
Education  - 1.3695  0.0726  -1.4096  -  -  -  - 0.7161  0.0604  -1.6155 
  (-3.66)
 **  (2.60)**  (-8.91)**  -  -  -  (- 2.02)
 *  (2.16)*  (-8.81)** 
Higher 
Education   - 3.4746  0.1343  0.5714  -  -  -  - 2.1236  0.0974  0.0213 
  (- 3.58)
 **  (1.87)
+  (1.15)  -  -  -  (- 2.19)
 *  (1.38)  (0.04) 
Hhsize  0.6331  0.0187  0.0843  1.3532  0.0282  -0.0109  0.4566  0.0179  0.1038 
  (8.02)
 **  (3.17)**  (2.68)**  (7.47)
 **  (1.92)
+  (-0.71)  (5.49)
 **  (2.70)**  (2.47)* 
Dependency  -5.2513  -0.3748  -0.3686  4.3071  0.3155  -0.4903  -3.6995  -0.3940  -1.7730 
  (-7.60)
 **  (-7.59)**  (-0.67)  (3.32)
 **  (3.06)**  (-4.73)**  (-4.26)
 **  (-7.09)**  (-2.81)** 
Caste_dum  3.9362  0.0874  1.4720  2.8163  0.0422  0.0681  3.7545  0.0665  1.9660 
  (12.20)
 **  (3.62)**  (11.33)**  (3.89)
 **  (0.72)  (1.11)  (11.00)
 **  (2.43)*  (11.52)** 
Hindu  1.3943  -0.1676  0.8821  0.2542  -0.4051  -0.1265  1.7074  -0.1435  1.0141 
  (2.48)
 *  (-3.98)**  (3.61)**  (0.08)  (-1.64)  (-0.49)  (3.12)
 **  (-3.38)**  (3.37)** 
Muslim  -1.2643  -0.2928  -0.3122  -2.0580  -0.6312  -0.2021  -0.8736  -0.2482  -0.4172 
  (-1.80)
 +  (-5.58)**  (-1.01)  (-0.63)  (-2.40)*  (-0.73)  (-1.22)  (4.51)**  (-1.04) 
Business 
Availability  11.5261  0.3885  -1.9807  3.1718  -0.9262  0.7008  7.5086  0.4787  -0.1016 
  (13.92)
 **  (6.84)**  (-2.39)*  (1.80)
 +  (-6.61)**  (5.00)**  (6.56)
 **  (8.33)**  (-0.11) 
Formal  banking 
sector   5.9715  0.1925  0.7192  6.4710  0.1781  0.0610  5.2984  0.1958  1.0329 
  (20.06)
 **  (8.65)**  (5.87)**  (10.51)
 **  (3.57)**  (1.16)  (16.08)
 **  (7.49)**  (6.12)** 




 **  (1.54)  (0.26)  (3.54)
 **  (3.13)**  (-1.80)
+  (4.07)
 **  (0.74)  (1.35) 
Money  lenders 
(loans)  16.1221  0.3274  -1.6644  -16.4192  -2.1508  6.2659  23.5341  0.8363  -4.6650 
  (2.91)
 **  (0.79)  (-0.76)  (-1.17)  (-1.88)
+  (5.23)**  (4.17)




(loans)  57.8164  0.7378  -1.2549  57.9332  -0.4488  0.9112  45.1227  0.5571  -1.2425 
  (7.33)
 **  (1.25)  (-0.40)  (3.94)
 **  (-0.38)  (0.73)  (5.02)
 **  (0.77)  (-0.27) 
Whether  in 
urban areas   8.3650  -0.0901  -2.1450  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  (18.04)
 **  (-2.76)**  (-5.22)**  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Θ  -6.6020  -0.8349  1.9543  15.4018  0.9678  -1.0519  -1.4821  -0.8986  -1.1644 
  (-6.78)
 **  (-14.63)**  (1.36)  (12.30)
 **  (10.94)**  (-22.18)**  (-0.84)  (-20.11)**  (-0.69) 
λ   5.4197  0.4482  - 0.8789  -8.1994  - 0.6549  0.7731  2.3222  0.4929  1.1413 
  (9.41)
 **  (13.41)**  (1.05)  (-11.51)
 **  (13.02)**  (30.09)**  (2.17)  (19.26)**  (11.05)** 
Constant  4.5311  0.5364 
 -1.0104  -3.8102  0.0187  0.5572  4.8925  0.6277  -0.9498 
  (2.75)  (4.44)**  (-1.02)
  (-0.84)  (0.05)  (1.46)  (2.61)
 **  (4.66)**  (-0.80) 





































Log likelihood  -21370.03  - 8122.59   κ  -5791.19  - 2334.57  - 2283.85-   -15504.9  5686.04   - 12961.3 
Note   ** = significant at 1% level.  * = significant at 5% level.  + = significant at 10% level and values in parenthesis are the 
z-values. κ – Number of iterations was restricted to two due to non-convergence.  λ 





Whether a household is a client of any MFI (“MFI_access”) 
 
   Househol
ds  with 
MFIs  
Household
s  without 
MFIs   Average  Poverty-Reducing Effect 
     
IBR  S.E.  t value  Income  S.E.  t value  Food   S.E.  t value 
            Security     
Total (Case A-1)  3908  1419  1.710  0.148  11.56**  0.057  0.00  18.23**  0.071  0.03  1.77
+ 
Urban(Case A-2)  1025  360  2.829  0.275  10.28**  0.038  0.01  5.71**  0.469  0.00  166.08** 
Rural(Case A-3)  2883  1059  1.273  0.119  10.70**  0.051  0.00  14.38**  0.104  0.04  2.70** 
Whether a household has taken a loan from MFI or from the group for a productive activity 
   Househol
ds  with 
MFIs  
Household




Average Poverty-Reducing Effect 
   
IBR  S.E. 
 
t value  Income  S.E. 
 
t value  Food 
Security 
S.E.  t value 
Total (Case B-1)  2794  2553  2.454  0.148  16.59**  - 0.087  0.00  - 24.47**  0.487  0.05  12.40** 
Urban (Case B-2)  525  860  1.619  0.275    5.89**  - 0.127  0.01  - 18.95**  0.221  0.01  28.36** 
Rural (Case B-3)  2269  1673  2.414  0.115  21.07**  - 0.07  0.00  - 16.49**  0.751  0.04  18.82** 




Table 3 Results of the Tobit Model - Main Covariate : Amount of Productive Loan   





Case A-1: Total 
 
Case A-2: Urban 
 
Case A-3: Rural 
IBR  Income 
Food 
Security  IBR  Income 
Food 




Prod. Loan     
0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 
  (7.80)
 **  (-2.64)**  (3.79)**  (6.56)
 **  (-0.03)  (0.05)  (1.81)
 +  (-3.63)**  (4.97)** 
Age                                     0.2131  0.0728  0.2729  0.2510  0.0897  0.1621  0.1495  0.0588  0.2915 
  (3.39)
 **  (2.75)**  (3.78)**  (1.98)
 *  (2.15)*  (0.19)  (1.98)
 **  (1.67)  (4.04)** 
Age_square                       -0.0010  -0.0007  -0.0017  -0.0005  -0.0008  0.0001  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0020 
  (-1.41)  (-2.28)*  (-2.18)*  (-0.31)  (-1.68)  (0.02)  (-0.80)  (-1.35)  (-2.47)* 
Female  3.5435  -0.3359  2.6740  2.5485  -0.0711  -7.0266  3.6331  -0.4979  3.0135 
  (7.06)
 **  (-1.66)  (4.23)**  (2.79)
 **  (-0.26)  (-1.30)  (6.25)
 **  (-1.75)  (4.71)** 
Primary 
Education 
-0.7042  0.5849  -1.5969  --  --  --  -0.2253  0.5040  -1.5513 
  (-1.81) *  (3.52)**  (-3.88)**  --  --  --  (-0.57)  (2.60)**  (-3.82)** 
Higher 
Education  
-0.7306  1.4685  1.6370  --  --  --  -0.6634  1.5131  1.9674 
  (-0.73)  (3.85)**  (1.61)  --  --  --  (-0.82)  (3.47)**  (1.96) 
Hhsize  0.6405  0.1086  0.2460  1.2659  0.0620  0.2941  0.4466  0.1151  0.2646 
  (7.66)
 **  (3.25)**  (2.61)**  (7.63)
 **  (1.27)  (0.27)  (4.44)
 **  (2.51)**  (2.78)** 
Dependency  -2.2994  -0.6410  -2.6835  0.4230  -0.4552  -2.9371  -3.4639  -0.9356  -2.5483 
  (-3.48)
 **  (-2.39)*  (-3.27)**  (0.38)  (-1.31)  (-0.38)  (-4.33)
 **  (-2.37)*  (-3.07)** 
Caste_dum  3.5655  0.4597  3.8621  3.4377  0.4368  -6.4231  3.5079  0.5372  4.1021 
  (10.56)
 **  (3.22)**  (9.60)**  (5.28)
 **  (2.10)*  (-1.47)  (8.53)
 **  (2.72)**  (10.18)** 
Hindu  1.0837  -1.1031  4.2988  -1.9028  -1.5902  38.0534  1.7622  -1.2397  4.1503 
  (1.89)
 +  (-5.05)**  (6.27)**  (-0.77)  (-2.46)**  (0.16)  (3.03)
 **  (-4.72)**  (6.14)** 
Muslim  -2.2786  -2.1329  1.8454  -4.6696  -2.6444  8.4982  -1.3715  -2.3771  1.6284 
  (-3.17)
 *  (-6.98)**  (2.22)*  (-1.72)
 +  (-3.47)**  (0.03)  (-1.84)
 +  (-6.17)**  (1.98) 
Business 
Availability 
6.1135  -0.0890  -3.6678  11.1072  -1.2991  8.8028  4.9203  0.6079  -4.1004 
  (9.07)
 **  (-0.32)  (-4.67)**  (7.36)
 **  (-2.72)**  (0.84)  (6.30)
 **  (1.65)  (-5.16)** 
Formal banking 
sector  
5.5118  1.1070  1.4880  6.1338  0.7522  3.9476  5.0338  1.3745  1.4123 
  (17.57)
 **  (8.68)**  (4.02)**  (10.92)
 **  (4.29)**  (1.02)  (12.98)
 **  (7.55)**  (3.77)** 
Formal banks 
(loans) 
8.7894  6.6972  -14.8170  -1.7829  4.3785  -37.6282  26.3306  12.4767  -21.2820 
  (1.00)  (2.45)**  (-1.11)  (-0.17)  (1.59)  (-0.42)  (1.36)  (2.14)*  (-1.41) 
Money lenders 
(loans) 
-10.8819  4.9489  -28.6145  -29.5721  -5.5225  72.5853  1.8952  11.9165  -47.1075 
  (-1.76) +  (2.35)*  (-3.70)**  (-2.41) *  (-1.50)  (1.61)  (0.21)  (4.00)**  (-5.06)** 
Friends/Relative
s(loans) 
44.1155  3.3603  -9.1064  53.0438  1.1555  -24.7174  36.01123  5.6079  -10.0227 
  (5.15)
 **  (1.11)  (-0.94)  (3.55)
 **  (0.28)  (-0.23)  (2.92)
 **  (1.35)  (-1.02) 
Whether in 
urban areas  
10.6499  0.8184  -16.6977  --  --    --     34 
 
  (26.34) **  (5.15)**  (-18.52)**  --  --  --  --    -- 
  Constant 
2.4711  -4.1488  -14.8426  6.4506  -1.5415  -76.3936  5.8872  -4.1900  -15.5068 
  (1.48)  (-5.79)**  (-7.20)**
  (1.64)  (-1.30)  (-0.31)  (3.11)
 **  (-4.27)**  (-7.48)** 
 
No. of Obs.  3718  3730  3722  1022  1022  1022  2696  2708  2700 
Notes:  ** = significant at 1% level.  * = significant at 5% level.  + = significant at 10% level and values in parenthesis are the z-values. 
 
 
Table 4 Results of Tobit Model – Main Covariate: Total Amount of Loan   
Dependent Variable - Poverty Measured Using Indexed Based Ranking 
 Explanatory 
Variables 
Case A-1: Total  Case A-2: Urban  Case A-3: Rural 
IBR  Income 
Food 
Security  IBR  Income 
Food 
Security  IBR  Income 
Food 
Security 
Total Loan Amount   0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 
  (11.93)
 **  (4.78)**  (0.18)  (9.99)
 **  (4.59)**  (-0.03)  (6.21)
 **  (2.32)*  (0.65) 
Age  0.1846  0.0685  0.2766  0.2511  0.0920  0.1657  0.1167  0.0526  0.2914 
  (2.96)
 **  (2.59)**  (3.82)**  (2.04)
 *  (2.21)*  (0.20)  (1.62)  (1.48)  (4.00)** 
Age_square  -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0018  -0.0007  -0.0009  0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0020 
  (-1.05)  (-2.11)*  (-2.24)*  (-0.50)  (-1.77)  (0.01)  (-0.41)  (-1.15)  (-2.46)** 
Female  3.6780  -0.3226  2.6976  2.6800  -0.0614  -7.0287  3.7270  -0.4862  3.0639 
  (7.41)
 **  (-1.60)  (4.25)**  (3.01)
 *  (-0.22)  (-1.30)  (6.29)
 **  (-1.70)  (4.77)** 
Primary Education  -0.6755  0.6197  -1.6742  --  --  --  -0.1595  0.5685  -1.6631 
  (-1.76)
 +  (3.75)**  (-4.06)**  --  --  --  (-0.40)  (2.92)**  (-4.07)** 
Higher Education   -0.8692  1.5266  1.4204  --  --  --  -0.5689  1.7032  1.6472 
  (-0.88)  (4.03)**  (1.39)  --  --  --  (-0.57)  (3.89)**  (1.64) 
Hhsize  0.5777  0.0872  0.2512  1.1679  0.0290  0.3055  0.4013  0.1067  0.2627 
  (6.97)
 **  (2.60)**  (2.65)**  (7.21)
 **  (0.60)  (0.28)  (4.18)
 **  (2.30)*  (2.74)** 
Dependency  -2.2461  -0.5200  -2.8789  0.6284  -0.3619  -2.9594  -3.4276  -0.7555  -2.8177 
  (-3.43)
 **  (-1.95)  (-3.50)**  (0.57)  (-1.05)  (-0.38)  (-4.27)
 **  (-1.92)  (-3.38)** 
Caste_dum  3.2450  0.3717  3.9176  2.6776  0.2771  -6.3695  3.3492  0.4902  4.1716 
  (9.67)
 **  (2.60)**  (9.69)**  (4.18)
 **  (1.34)  (-1.44)  (8.55)
 **  (2.47)**  (10.26)** 
Hindu  1.5773  -1.0418  4.3705  -1.1923  -1.4688  50.0110  2.2076  -1.2157  4.2872 
  (2.77)
 **  (-4.79)**  (6.340**  (-0.49)  (-2.31)*  (0.05)  (3.71)
 **  (-4.60)**  (6.28)** 
Muslim  -1.4463  -1.9592  1.8840  -3.3724  -2.3550  8.9304  -0.6501  -2.2553  1.7533 
  (-2.02)
 *  (-6.43)**  (2.250*  (-1.27)  (-3.14)**  (0.01)  (-0.84)
 **  (-5.80)**  (2.10)* 
Business Availability  5.7153  -0.4414  -3.0710  11.3539  -1.4526  8.8535  4.1074  -0.0755  -3.2900 
  (8.60)
 **  (-1.60)  (-3.85)**  (7.75)
 **  (-3.05)**  (0.85)  (5.24)
 **  (-0.20)  (-4.02)** 
Formal  banking 
sector   5.4049  1.0548  1.5617  5.9600  0.7067  3.9582  4.8994  1.3068  1.5134 
  (17.40)
 **  (8.29)**  (4.20)**  (10.89)
 **  (4.07)**  (1.02)  (13.02)
 **  (7.16)**  (4.01)** 
Formal  banks 
(loans)  -65.6581  -8.3854  1.3260  -64.4372  -6.5335  -33.9900  -63.2617  -11.7440  -3.5300 
  (-5.67)
 **  (-2.31)*  (0.07)  (-4.90)
 **  (-1.91)  (-0.33)  (-2.82)
 **  (-1.30)  (-0.16) 
Money  lenders 
(loans)  -84.0651  -10.1743  -16.0145 
-
102.9103  -16.5651  75.2041  -87.0042  -12.3734  -33.4194 35 
 
  (-8.63)
 **  (-3.22)**  (-1.02)  (-6.98)
 **  (-3.79)**  (0.94)  (-4.74)
 **  (-1.63)  (-1.71) 
Friends/Relatives(lo
ans)  -49.8155  -11.3501  -6.6957  -21.3312  -11.1331  -19.7145  -72.8628  -14.0131  -15.2666 
  (-4.10)
 **  (-2.75)**  (-0.38)  (-1.24)  (-2.29)*  (-0.16)  (-3.48)
 **  (-1.61)  (-0.74) 
Whether  in  urban 
areas   10.2096  0.7404  -16.7161  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
  (25.45)
 **  (4.65)**  (-18.44)**  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Constant  2.6328  -4.0342  -15.0037  5.9754  -1.5276  -88.4633  5.9426  -4.1381  -15.6778 
  (1.59)  (-5.65)**  (-7.25)**
  (1.56)  (-1.30)  (-0.08)  (3.07)
 **  (-4.20)**  (-7.52)** 
No. of Obs.  3718  3730  3722  1022  1022  1022  2696  2708  2700 





Appendix 1:  Descriptive Statistics and Definitions of the Variables  
                                                    With Access to MFI   Without Access to MFI     With Access to MFI loan 
for productive purposes 
Without Access to MFI loan 
for productive purposes 
 
Variable  Definition   Obs  Mean  S.D.  Obs  Mean  S.D.    Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean  S.D.   
Age  Age of household fead                         
  (Total)  3908  39.341  12.241  1419  41.599  14.072    2794  39.377  12.296  2533  40.567  13.292   
  (Urban)  1025  37.300  11.531  360  38.783  12.704    525  37.341  11.475  860  37.897  12.092   
   (Rural)  2883  40.067  12.404  1059  42.556  14.388    2269  39.848  12.433  1673  41.940  13.671   
Female  Whether a hh head is female                       
  (Total)  3908  0.904  0.295  1419  0.929  0.257    2794  0.928  0.258  2533  0.891  0.312   
  (Urban)  1025  0.898  0.303  360  0.928  0.259    525  0.914  0.280  860  0.900  0.300   
   (Rural)  2883  0.906  0.291  1059  0.929  0.257    2269  0.932  0.252  1673  0.886  0.317   
Primary   Education of the household head, 1= completed primary school, 0= otherwise.                 
  (Total)  3908  0.552  0.497  1419  0.517  0.500    2794  0.523  0.500  2533  0.565  0.496   
  (Urban)*  1025  1.000  0.000  360  1.000  0.000    525  1.000  0.000  860  1.000  0.000   
   (Rural)  2883  0.393  0.489  1059  0.352  0.478    2269  0.413  0.492  1673  0.341  0.474   
Higher   Education of the household head,  1= completed higher education, 0=otherwise.                
  (Total)  3908  0.022  0.146  1419  0.025  0.155    2794  0.015  0.122  2533  0.031  0.173   
  (Urban)*  1025  0.000  0.000  360  0.000  0.000    525  0.000  0.000  860  0.000  0.000   
   (Rural)  2883  0.029  0.169  1059  0.033  0.179    2269  0.019  0.135  1673  0.047  0.211   
Hhsize  Household size: number of household members                   
  (Total)  3908  5.075  2.024  1419  4.913  2.038    2794  5.253  2.053  2533  4.788  1.974   
  (Urban)  1025  4.780  1.844  360  4.439  1.756    525  4.798  1.942  860  4.626  1.751   
   (Rural)  2883  5.180  2.075  1059  5.075  2.102    2269  5.358  2.064  1673  4.871  2.075   
Depratio  Dependency Ratio (Ratio of household members under 15 or                  
over  60  to  the  total)                  
(Total)  3908  0.563  0.253  1419  0.626  0.274    2794  0.536  0.240  2533  0.628  0.273   
  (Urban)  1025  0.602  0.262  360  0.702  0.276    525  0.553  0.237  860  0.674  0.277   
   (Rural)  2883  0.549  0.249  1059  0.600  0.269    2269  0.531  0.241  1673  0.605  0.269   
Caste_dum  Whether a household belongs to scheduled caste or not                   
  (Total)  3908  0.685  0.465  1419  0.693  0.462    2794  0.711  0.453  2533  0.660  0.474   
  (Urban)  1025  0.748  0.434  360  0.792  0.407    525  0.819  0.385  860  0.723  0.448   
   (Rural)  2883  0.663  0.473  1059  0.659  0.474    2269  0.686  0.464  1673  0.628  0.483   
Hindu  Whether a household head is Hindu or not                     
  (Total)  3908  0.769  0.422  1419  0.792  0.406    2794  0.758  0.429  2533  0.794  0.404   
  (Urban)  1025  0.930  0.256  360  0.911  0.285    525  0.926  0.262  860  0.924  0.264   
   (Rural)  2883  0.712  0.453  1059  0.752  0.432    2269  0.719  0.450  1673  0.727  0.445   
Muslim  Whether a household head is Muslim or not                   37 
 
  (Total)  3908  0.115  0.319  1419  0.106  0.308    2794  0.137  0.344  2533  0.085  0.279   
  (Urban)  1025  0.059  0.235  360  0.086  0.281    525  0.057  0.232  860  0.071  0.257   
   (Rural)  2883  0.135  0.341  1059  0.113  0.317    2269  0.156  0.363  1673  0.092  0.289   
Business 
Availability  Whether there is a business opportunity available to the household           
  (Total)  3908  0.412  0.264  1419  0.375  0.263    2794  0.447  0.267  2533  0.353  0.252     
  (Urban)  1025  0.548  0.196  360  0.529  0.196    525  0.605  0.165  860  0.505  0.204     
   (Rural)  2883  0.364  0.268  1059  0.322  0.262    2269  0.411  0.272  1673  0.274  0.238     
Formal Banks  Whether a household has any transaction with the formal bank           
(transaction)  (Total)  3908  0.383  0.486  1419  0.443  0.497    2794  0.419  0.494  2533  0.377  0.485     
  (Urban)  1025  0.482  0.500  360  0.497  0.501    525  0.531  0.499  860  0.458  0.499     
   (Rural)  2883  0.348  0.476  1059  0.424  0.494    2269  0.393  0.489  1673  0.335  0.472     
Formal Banks  The balance of loan of a household from the formal bank                    
(loan)  (Total)  3908  0.002  0.018  1419  0.003  0.019    2794  0.002  0.013  2533  0.003  0.022     
  (Urban)  1025  0.004  0.027  360  0.006  0.035    525  0.003  0.020  860  0.005  0.034     
   (Rural)  2883  0.002  0.013  1059  0.002  0.008    2269  0.002  0.011  1673  0.002  0.012     
Money lenders  The balance of loan of a household from Money lenders                   
(loan)  (Total)  3908  0.011  0.040  1419  0.012  0.061    2794  0.013  0.055  2533  0.009  0.035     
  (Urban)  1025  0.007  0.022  360  0.006  0.016    525  0.007  0.019  860  0.007  0.022     
   (Rural)  2883  0.012  0.044  1059  0.014  0.070    2269  0.014  0.060  1673  0.010  0.040     
Relatives  and 
friends  The balance of loan of a household from relatives and friends           
(loan)  (Total)  3908  0.004  0.019  1419  0.006  0.023    2794  0.005  0.023  2533  0.004  0.016     
  (Urban)  1025  0.005  0.019  360  0.006  0.024    525  0.007  0.025  860  0.004  0.016     
   (Rural)  2883  0.004  0.019  1059  0.006  0.023    2269  0.005  0.022  1673  0.004  0.017     
Formal Bank Availability (share of the households with access to formal banks at the village level- Excluding microfinance)      
  (Total)  3908  0.398  0.200  1419  0.402  0.194    2794  0.399  0.206  2533  0.399  0.190     
  (Urban)  1025  0.494  0.224  360  0.463  0.225    525  0.526  0.230  860  0.462  0.218     
   (Rural)  2883  0.364  0.178  1059  0.381  0.177    2269  0.369  0.188  1673  0.367  0.164     
Urban_dum  Whether a household is in urban areas or not                     
   (Total)  3908  0.262  0.440  1419  0.254  0.435    2794  0.188  0.391  2533  0.340  0.474     
IBR indicator  Indexed Based Ranking of a household's wellbeing                   
  (Total)  3718  25.14  11.753  1358  23.52  11.88    2643  25.736  11.257  2433  23.58  12.29     
  (Urban)  1022  34.057  11.229  360  30.836  12.027    523  35.987  10.529  859  31.532  11.782     






Appendix  2:  Results  of  Propensity  Score  Matching:  Effects  of  MFIs  in  Reducing  Poverty 
(Estimation using Bootstrapped Standard Errors, 100 Rps.) for Total Sample   
 
Whether a household is a client of any MFI (“MFI_access”)     
  
Households 
with MFIs  
Households 
without MFIs  
Average  Poverty-Reducing 
Effect  S.E.  t value 
Nearest Neighbour Matching         
Total (Case A-1)  3908  1059  2.084  0.48  4.339** 
Urban(Case A-2)  1025  275  4.038  0.914  4.420** 
Rural (Case A-3)  2883  772  0.769  0.574  1.340 
Kernel Matching                                     
Total (Case A-1)  3908  1419  1.705  0.287  5.932** 
Urban (Case A-2)  1025  360  3.212  0.693  4.635** 
Rural (Case A-3)  2883  1058  1.095  0.364  3.011** 
             
Whether a household has taken a loan from MFI or from the 
group for a productive activity 
 
 
  (MFI_Productive) 
  
Households 
with MFIs  
Households 
without MFIs  
Average  Poverty-Reducing 
Effect  S.E.  t value 
Nearest  Neighbour 
Matching           
Total (Case B-1)  2794  1226  0.182  0.475  3.829** 
Urban (Case B-2)  525  311  0.888  1.088  0.816 
Rural (Case B-3)  2269  868  2.488  0.501  4.970** 
Kernel Matching                                        
Total (Case B-1)  2794  2521  2.29  0.292  7.848** 
Urban (Case B-2)  525  840  1.865  0.525  3.553** 
Rural (Case B-3)  2269  1669  2.489  0.357  6.973** 

















Appendix  3:  Results  of  Propensity  Score  Matching:  Effects  of  MFIs  in  Reducing  Poverty 
(Estimation using Bootstrapped Standard Errors, 100 Rps.) for the Poor and the Moderately Poor. 
Whether a household is a client of any MFI (“MFI_access”) 
  
Households 
with MFIs  
Households 
without MFIs  
Average  Poverty-Reducing 
Effect  S.E.  t value 
For the Poor                
Nearest Neighbour Matching             
Total (Case A-1)  1184  351  0.735  0.331  2.119* 
Urban(Case A-2)  78  24  0.603  1.108  0.544 
Rural(Case A-3)  1106  324  0.91  0.359  2.535* 
Kernel Matching             
Total (Case A-1)  1184  495  0.86  0.207  4.149** 
Urban (Case A-2)  78  39  0.682  0.939  0.762 
Rural (Case A-3)  1106  449  0.863  0.212  4.071** 
For the Moderately Poor             
Nearest Neighbour Matching             
Total (Case A-1)  2493  740  0.767  0.394  1.948* 
Urban(Case A-2)  397  127  2.111  0.739  2.854** 
Rural(Case A-3)  2096  587  1.268  0.428  2.96** 
Kernel Matching             
Total (Case A-1)  2493  960  1.22  0.24  5.079** 
Urban (Case A-2)  397  183  1.574  0.534  2.950** 
Rural (Case A-3)  2093  775  1.186  0.287  4.125** 
             
Whether a household has taken a loan from MFI for a productive activity (MFI_Productive) 
  
Households 
with MFIs  
Households 
without MFIs  
Average  Poverty-Reducing 
Effect  S.E.  t value 
For the Poor                
Nearest Neighbour Matching             
Total (Case A-1)  749  373  0.869  0.33  2.607** 
Urban(Case A-2)  11  10  0.091  2.501  0.036 
Rural(Case A-3)  738  384  0.956  0.358  2.667** 
Kernel Matching             
Total (Case A-1)  749  914  1.056  0.214  4.941** 
Urban (Case A-2)  11  83  -0.619  2.031  -0.305 
Rural (Case A-3)  738  805  1.088  0.247  4.408** 
For the Moderately Poor             
Nearest Neighbour Matching             
Total (Case B-1)  1740  794  1.891  0.338  5.59** 
Urban(Case B-2)  173  109  1.827  0.77  2.371* 
Rural(Case B-3)  1567  675  2.172  0.434  5.001** 
Kernel Matching             
Total (Case B-1)  1740  1695  2.228  0.244  9.114** 
Urban (Case B-2)  173  408  2.046  0.482  4.241** 
Rural (Case B-3)  1567  1303  2.200  0.262  8.385** 
 